 USS Kitty Hawk in support of Rolling Thunder Mar. 1967 How do we remember the Vietnam War? Public opinion varies greatly and with fervor and, most likely, you hold a personal sentiment about the war on one side of the aisle or the other. Regardless of personal opinion, one operation comes to the forefront as an overall metaphor for the nature of the war, the relationship between command and troops, the effectiveness of our involvement and the tenuous political tensions which surrounded the conflict. This string of events began in February 1965 and was called Operation Rolling Thunder, a major Air Force-led operation by the United States, finally ending in October 1968.
The original plan laid out by President Lyndon B. Johnson involved a short 8-week bombing expedition to cut supply and troop movement along the infamous Ho Chi Minh Trail. The hope was that escalating violence would force Ho Chi Minh to recognize the United States’ forces and he would submit his power at Hanoi. In an effort to avoid baiting Communist forces from China and the Soviet Union in Vietnam, Johnson and his command restricted the bombing away from Hanoi, the Chinese border and other important towns along the trail. These restrictions were the first in a series of issues taken by troop leaders and stateside politicians to perhaps placate the war protestors straining the social fabric of domestic cohesion.
The operation failed to accomplish set objectives within the first two weeks. Soon, the relationship between the President and the Air Force commanders began to unravel as they felt that Pres. Johnson greatly underestimated the potential for loss of aircraft and soldiers. In addition, they felt that bombing rural, seemingly non-strategic areas with little effort placed on the bases and cities feeding the North Vietnamese war effort would be a drastic misuse of resources. Also, the Air Force argued that the parameters of the operation suffocated the effectiveness of the troops. In the perfect situation, according to General Curtis LeMay, the United States would allow the Air Force to engage in quick, sharp attacks centered on important government strongholds, where an effect would be immediate.
This strain caused disjunction between presidential policy and sentiment of those commissioned to undertake the orders. In a time when domestic protests weighed heavily on the war effort, this fracture in opinion further damaged the operation.
 B-52 Heavy enroute to target, Operation Rolling Thunder As the U.S. continued its effort, the operation was hampered by restrictions regarding bombing anything near an area occupied by non-Vietnamese troops. The last thing the U.S. forces needed was to unintentionally kill a Chinese or Soviet troop in a city or around a base, leading to all-out world war. This restriction made it nearly impossible for the operation to affect anything of significant importance, and the supply of troops and resources in the cities felt little or no impact from the bombings. In fact, troop and supply routes increased in effectiveness later, when the United States halted bombing all together to engage in tentative negotiations with the North Vietnamese in 1968.
Domestic turmoil increased around 1966 and into 1967 regarding the operation, as political candidates and civilians began to hear and see the effect of the bombings on the news. During the operation as a whole, the United States dropped more pounds of bombs than in all of World War Two. Soon, people began to take a stand against the bombing of “civilian areas”. They argued that the expedition was a wasteful operation focusing on areas that had no real value to Ho Chi Minh’s military, destroying civilian towns while killing and maiming thousands. As the operation greatly increased the number of American POWs taken by the Vietnamese Army, tensions grew stronger and people argued the operation lacked direction and effectiveness. What was first promoted as a short-term bombing campaign had grown into a drawn out years-long operation. In the eyes of those in America, the operation had little to show in the way of success, with many failures accruing daily.
In 1968, feeling the effect of domestic and international tension, President Johnson, hoping to engage in negotiations with Ho Chi Minh, restricted the operation even further to the point where it was barely in effect. Negotiations began on 31 March 1968. However, talks were bogged down by petty matters and they seemed to accomplish little. This led to President Johnson making military concessions in hopes of gaining a foothold in the negotiations. After the negotiations hit a stalemate, President Johnson ended the talks, having gained little in return for his concessions and his end to the bombing of supply routes.
Further negotiations began in 1969, and, finally, issues began to be resolved. These talks ultimately led to the United States pulling out of Vietnam in the early 1970s, leaving the Operation Rolling Thunder soldiers and domestic society wondering what the campaign had truly accomplished.
Operation Rolling Thunder truly defined the Vietnam War, and it serves as an indicator of the true nature of the world’s perception of the entire conflict. Studying the campaign through the historic lens, it is plain to see that Operation Rolling Thunder embodied many of the principles that caused great domestic controversy and turmoil. With questions being raised about the use of resources, the bombing of civilian areas, the rift between command and troops coupled with the attempt to avoid waking the sleeping giants of international Communism, Operation Rolling Thunder represented the problems many saw with the entire war, and embodied the obstacles standing in the way of an all-out U.S. victory in Vietnam.
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