“In order to provide the infantry with immediate and reliable artillery fire support, the American military deployed artillery pieces in two ways. One was the unprepared or “hasty,” artillery position. It consisted of one or more 105mm howitzers, each airlifted to a location by a CH-47 “Chinook” helicopter, or towed by a two-and-one-half-ton truck - “a deuce and a half." The more elaborate artillery position was the fire support base (FSB). A typical FSB was a semi-permanent emplacement that contained an artillery battery of six 105mm howitzers and fortifications for self-defense. Constructed in the midst of an infantry unit’s TAOR, a fire support base’s guns delivered thirty- three-pound explosive shells with a “kill radius” of 30 meters at a range of 11,000 meters under all conditions of weather and visibility. Often, the fire was augmented by larger 155mm howitzers to provide support at longer ranges.

When friendly infantry was operating at great distances from the FSB the artillery commander, sometimes added eight-inch howitzers or l75mm guns. Usually several fire support bases were established in a TAOR, so that any part of it could be reached by fire. Positioned within range of each other, FSBs provided mutually supporting interlocking fires.

Whenever possible, sites for fire support bases were selected in open areas, away from tall trees, This served the dual purpose of making it difficult for enemy infiltrators to sneak up on the position and permitting the artillery pieces to be fired at lower angles of elevation. Sometimes, however, the FSB had to be carved out of the deep jungle by huge bulldozers called Rome plows. To minimize the area that was to be cleared and to provide for a better all-around defense of the FSB, the combat engineers sometimes drove a stake in the center of the area and then inscribed a forty-meter circle, measuring with a rope tied to the stake.

Within the circle the engineers built an observation tower, a command post, and supply and ammunition dumps. Working with artillerymen, they set out six 105mm howitzers, collectively called a “battery,” often in a “star” pattern. Emplacements for the batteries included sandbagged walls, ammunition racks, a tool room, and crew quarters. Among the six howitzers, soldiers set out four 81mm mortars and dug bunkers at five-meter intervals along the FSB perimeter for infantrymen armed with rifles, grenade launchers, and machine guns.

 Next, combat engineers used another rope, often 75 meters long (246 feet), and inscribed a second circular perimeter (usually misshapen as a result of terrain irregularities), Along the outer perimeter they set one or more coils of barbed wire, fixing claymore mines and trip flares to the wire. At one point on this perimeter a fortified and guarded point for exit and entry was built. From it, infantry patrols moved out to perform surveillance of the area around the FSB. The FSB also included a landing zone for helicopters.

Soldiers in artillery units performed three sorts of fire missions. One was harassment and interdiction (H&I) fire aimed at targets where military intelligence suspected enemy activity. Another was reconnaissance or preparation fire, fired in the hope of detonating  and dispersing concentrations of troops before an American or ARVN infantry unit entered the target area. The third sort of fire mission was direct support to assist infantry units engaged in battle with enemy forces.

Coordination of infantry operations and artillery fire missions was a complicated and exacting procedure. A field artillery forward observer (FO) traveled with each rifle company on operations. Serving as the eyes and ears of the artillery, the FO radioed a description of the target - troops, bunkers, or vehicles - to the fire direction center (FDC). At the FDC a fire direction officer (FDO) evaluated the FO’s request with the aid of his staff of five enlisted men. A radio telephone operator (RTO) maintained communications between the FO in the field, the FDC, and the gun crews. Enlisted fire direction specialists plotted the target location on a chart or map and then established its distance and direction.

Based on this information a fire direction specialist then plotted the distance to the target and the difference in elevation between the guns and the target on slide-rule-like devices called graphical firing tables. These calculations allowed the specialist to determine the elevation at which the gun muzzles needed to be set to reach the target. Next, the fire direction officer determined the number and type of shells to be used, and ordered the RTO to relay the information to the gun crews. Each artillery piece was controlled by a chief who supervised aiming, loading, and firing. A gunner set direction, an assistant gunner set elevation, and two or three cannoneers attached fuses to shells, loaded them into the breech, and removed the spent casings.

Artillery In action

One morning in the middle of June 1966, army First Lieutenant John D. Lewis returned from a seven-day R&R leave in Bangkok to Tuy Hoa, the coastal II Corps district where his unit, C Battery, 5th Battalion, 27th Artillery, was based. But C Battery was gone. Ordered twenty-two kilometers due north to an area five kilometers west of Tuy An, all six guns of C Battery were in place at an unprepared, or “hasty,” artillery position Its fire direction center was located in a schoolhouse nearby. Lieutenant Lewis was flown by helicopter to the area, He walked through the door of the ramshackle plywood schoolhouse and asked what was going on. “We’re supportin’ the 2d of the 327th,” someone answered, “and they’re surrounded. Things are hot!”

 Two companies of the 2d Battalion, 327th Infantry (Airborne), of the 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division, bad been dropped by helicopter on a hill six kilometers north of C Battery’s position. Ordered to drive elements of the NVA 95th. Regiment east to the sea, the two infantry companies were ambushed soon after landing.

“They got their asses kicked,” Lewis said. “That is, they were in a very untenable position.” Fortunately f or them, C Battery’s guns had been registered, or sighted in, on the area. For the next two days Lieutenant Lewis acted as artillery fire direction officer for C Battery.

Inside the schoolhouse, the fire direction center’s personnel manned equipment. On one wall hung a large situation map plotted with the locations of friendly units and known enemy units. On a table with folding legs was the firing chart used by the FDC crew to compute the firing data for the howitzers.

“It was organized chaos,” Lewis said. “You reacted to what was going on. When you fired missions you checked the calculations of the computers, listened to battle activity over the radio loud-speakers, decided whether to fire and, if so, what kind of shells and how many. If you weren’t firing missions, you kept up with the ammo count and stayed close to the situation map.

“1 don’t know how many thousands of rounds we fired,” Lewis said. “Every call that came over the radio was ‘Help! Help!’ As soon as the FO’s keyed their mikes, we could hear the rounds landing, we could hear the small-arms fire. We could hear guys screaming orders like ‘Get the one over there, man!’ ‘Hurry up with that machine gun ammo!’ or ‘Somebody get a medevac! so and so’s hit!’ ” When the FO evaluated the effect of the artillery fires, he might. abandon standard radio procedure and say something like, “That landed right on top of them!” or “You got the sons of bitches! I see five bodies layin’ there!”

Outside the FDC among the six 105mm howitzers there was a frenzy of activity. “It was like watching a war movie with the artillery in action,” Lewis recalled. With their shirts off and their trousers out of their boots, the sweating six-man gun crews responded quickly to each fire mission. “They were working hard, but they were happy because they were firing. They get real keyed up when they’re firing.” At the end of the second day the recoil mechanisms on each of the guns began to break down from constant use.

 Despite lack of sleep and the stress of decision-making, Lewis found the experience exhilarating. “A situation like this, knowing there are troops out there in contact, and you know somebody’s ass depends on whether you hit the target.” When the FO called in after a fire mission and reported enemy casualties Lewis felt satisfaction. “But it’s more a sense of helping the friendlies than hurting the enemy.

You’re shooting because somebody’s out there screaming for help, not to see how many guys you can waste.”

Some days later soldiers in the artillery of C Battery received patches bearing the “screaming eagle” insignia of the infantry companies’ parent division, the 101st Airborne Division. Many of the 105 men of C Battery proudly wore them on their right shoulders, signifying they had served with units of the 101st in combat.

The End