Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto, Commander in Chief of the Japanese Combined Fleet, had presented his plans for the campaign to the General Staff at the beginning of April 1942. It called for luring the remnants of the American Pacific Fleet to the defense of the solitary outpost, forcing it into a decisive battle, and destroying it.

The Naval General Staff agreed that a decisive battle was necessary at that point in the war, but was not convinced that Midway, only 1,136 miles west-northwest of Pearl Harbor, was the best place to fight it. Instead, many members advocated cutting the lines of communication between the US and Australia by advancing on the islands of Fiji and Samoa.

In addition, II Fleet objected on the grounds that it was not ready; IV Fleet, which was detailed to look after logistical problems following the occupation of the island, claimed it could not guarantee its ability to carry out this function even if the operation was successful; and I Air Fleet wanted to postpone the campaign to gain some time for rest and refitting after extensive operations in the Indian Ocean. Others pointed out that if the battle took place as planned, Japan’s two most powerful carriers, the Shokaku and Zuikaku, would have to be left behind.

But Yamamoto stood firm. One of Japan’s greatest military geniuses, with the rare ability both to devise original ideas and translate them into action, he had never been entirely confident about his island country’s ability to wage war against an industrial giant like the United States. Before the war he had warned the Premier, General Hideki Tojo, that ‘If I am told to fight. . . I shall run wild for the first six months or a year, but I have utterly no confidence for the second and third years.’ His outlook was not improved by the success of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor; he wrote to his sister, ‘. . . in spite of all the clamor that is going on we could lose [the war]. I can only do my best.’ He now felt that success at Midway was not only vital strategically, but essential to Japan’s survival. Eventually the General Staff gave in.

Just at this time, on 18 April, 16 B-25 bombers led by Lieutenant Colonel James Doolittle carried out a surprise attack on Tokyo from the aircraft carriers Enterprise and Hornet. They inflicted very little physical damage, but the psychological impact of this first attack on the Home Islands themselves was enormous. The Japanese had no idea where the raid came from (Roosevelt’s comment that it had come from Shangri-La was not very helpful), and many suspected that it had originated from Midway. To the major goal of the Midway campaign — the destruction of the American fleet and subsequent mastery of the Pacific Ocean — was added another purpose: capture of the island would protect the Emperor from the indignity of being bombed again. It would also mean the elimination of an important refueling base for US submarines and provide a base for future raids on Pearl Harbor.

On 5 May, then, Imperial General Headquarters issued the order: ‘Commander in Chief Combined Fleet will, in co-operation with the Army, invade and occupy strategic points in the Western Aleutians and Midway Island.’

By that time the first phase in the great Japanese offensive — the campaign to achieve control of the Coral Sea by seizing Tulagi in the Solomon Islands and Port Moresby in Papua — was well underway. The Battle of the Coral Sea, which began on 8 May, was a portent of the trend in naval battles. For the first time in history, two fleets fought at a range of more than a hundred miles, without ever seeing each other. It was aircraft carrier against aircraft carrier while the great obsolete battleships proved to be of little use.

The opposing forces in that battle were more or less evenly matched; the Japanese V Carrier Division under Rear Admiral Chuichi Hara contained the two carriers Shokaku and Zuikaku, while Task Forces 17 and 11 contained the two American carriers Lexington and Yorktown. Tactically, the action could be called a draw. The Japanese sank one heavy carrier — the Lexington — and heavily damaged Yorktown. On the other hand the Americans did achieve their aim of preventing the occupation of Port Moresby and, in addition, gained good experience in the tactical use of carriers. The Americans inflicted their share of damage as well: the Shokaku was so badly damaged that she was forced to retire for two months for repairs, while the Zuikaku lost so many crews and planes that she too had to return to Japan to be refitted. Overall, the Japanese pilots showed themselves unused to night operations and not all up to the high standards demonstrated at Pearl Harbor; over three-quarters of their bombing planes and pilots were lost. But the setback in the Battle of the Coral Sea — the first the Japanese had suffered — confirmed Yamamoto in his belief that top priority had to be given to the destruction of the rest of the American Fleet. Thus, the stage was set for the Midway campaign.

Yamamoto’s battle plan, modeled on Hannibal’s strategy at Cannae and Ludendorff’s at Tannenberg, was a complicated one, utilizing the diversionary tactics and division of forces that were always integral parts of Japanese strategy. The standard Japanese pattern was to lure the enemy into an unfavorable tactical position, cut off his retreat, drive in on his flanks, and then concentrate forces for the kill.

Midway was no exception; Yamamoto’s plan called for a strike on 3 June against Dutch Harbor in the Aleutians. Destruction of the American base and occupation of the western islands would not only secure the northern-most anchors of Japan’s proposed ‘ribbon defense,’ but would, he hoped, lure the US Pacific Fleet northward. While the Americans were rushing to defend the Aleutians the Japanese would bomb and occupy Midway by 5 June. Then when the American fleet returned, before 7 June, Japanese planes based on the island and on carriers would mount an intensive bombing offensive. Any ships that escaped would be sunk by the Japanese battleships and cruisers.

Surprise was the key element in Yamamoto’s plan; there was to be no challenge from the Americans until after Midway had been occupied. Even if the enemy did not take up the Aleutian challenge, they could not get to Midway before 7 June. And even if they did not contest the occupation, the pressure from Midway on Pearl Harbor would soon force them to counterattack.

The Japanese force was divided into five sections. An Advance Force of 16 submarines would harass the Americans as they approached Midway from either the Aleutians or Pearl Harbor. The Northern Area Force under Vice Admiral Hosogaya consisted of the light carriers Ryujo and Junjo, along with two heavy cruisers, a destroyer screen, and four transport ships carrying troops for occupying the Aleutian islands of Adak, Attu, and Kiska.

The most power lay with Vice-Admiral Chuichi Nagumo’s Main Striking Force: the four big carriers Akagi, Kaga, Hiryu, and Soryu, and their screen of destroyers and cruisers. Nagumo’s task was to launch air strikes against Midway, to soften it up for Admiral Nobutake Kondo’s Midway Occupation Force. Kondo had two battleships, six heavy cruisers, and many destroyers to support the 12 transports carrying a 5000-man occupation force.

Yamamoto was 300 miles behind Nagumo and Kondo, with the Main Body — a force composed of nine battleships and two light carriers, with their attendant cruiser and destroyer screen. He was flying his flag in the newly-constructed Yamato which, with its nine r8-inch guns, was the biggest and most powerful battleship in the world. There was little chance that the battleships, with a maximum range of only o miles, would play much part in the battle; some of Nagumo’s younger officers claimed caustically that the battleship fleet was holding a naval review in the Pacific.

But Yamamoto, despite the great importance that he gave to aircraft and carriers, still felt it necessary to compromise with the conservatives who still advocated big ships and big guns.

The Japanese Fleet contained almost the entire fighting force of the Japanese Navy — 162 ships including four heavy carriers, four light carriers, 11 battleships, 22 cruisers, 65 destroyers, and 21 submarines.

To counter the blow that Yamamoto was planning, the Americans had three carriers — the Enterprise, Hornet, and Yorktown, eight cruisers, and 15 destroyers. There were no battleships; they rested on the bottom of Pearl Harbor, except for a few stationed on the West Coast that were too old and too slow to be of any real use in modern warfare. But even that small force was more than Yamamoto had thought the Americans could assemble. He believed that the Yorktown had been sunk in the Battle of the Coral Sea along with the Lexington, when in fact she had managed somehow to limp back to Pearl Harbor. Much has been made of the fact that the carrier was repaired and reprovisioned in three days and three nights, when the job would normally have taken 90 days. But it would be far from accurate to imply that the repairs were anything other than rough jury-rigging. The hull was patched and damaged compartments were braced with timbers. But only a few of the watertight doors were fixed and three superheated boilers that had been knocked out were not even touched. The ship would never be able to make a speed better than 27 knots.

The island of Midway itself served as a base for 54 Marine Corps planes (including 25 obsolete Brewster Buffalo fighters), 32 Navy Catalinas, and 23 Air Force planes (including 17 B-17s and six brand new Navy Avenger torpedo bombers). In addition to its planes, the island had two good search radars, was dotted with artillery, and had almost 3,000 men in Army and Marine units dug in and protected by bombproof shelters throughout the island. The actual invasion never took place, but if it had there is no certainty it would have succeeded. Midway’s defenses were as carefully prepared as Tarawa’s would be later in the war, and Kondo’s force of 5,000 was not nearly as impressive as the American force that eventually took Tarawa.

Admiral Chester Nimitz, Commander in Chief of the Pacific Fleet, was the man charged with containing the Japanese threat.

Continued in Part Two  . . . . .