The Yorktown would wait to recover her search planes and obtain further information. At the same time (about 0530 hours) every plane on Midway was being ordered into the air in response to the Catalina’s warning; by 0600 hours the only plane left on the ground was an old Grumman single-float biplane. Most of the interceptors were elderly, slow, Marine Corps Buffaloes — no match for the efficient new Zeros. But anti-aircraft fire on the island was good and about a third of the Japanese strike force was shot down. They had inflicted a fair amount of damage on the ground installations — barracks, mess halls, oil tanks, even the hospital. But casualties were light and the runways remained useable. Six new Navy Avenger torpedo bombers and four Army B-26s streaked after the recent attackers to counterattack, and 16 B-17s already in the air were also ordered to turn north and attack the Japanese carriers.

Nagumo’s second strike force (93 planes) was waiting on its flight decks, armed with bombs and torpedoes, in case enemy surface forces appeared. But the returning planes from the first strike reported that the island would require another attack — a point that was emphasized by the appearance of the ten American planes from Midway even though they were not able to score a hit.

At 0715 hours Nagumo ordered the second wave planes taken below and rearmed with incendiary and fragmentation bombs for an attack on the island, clearing the decks for the return of the first wave; the entire process would take about an hour. Although in retrospect the order appears to have been a colossal blunder, at the time it seemed a reasonable move; Japanese scout planes had found no sign of an American surface force in the area, and Midway obviously had to be struck again since planes from the island had just attacked Nagumo’s own ship.

But not quite 15 minutes later, at 0728 hours, the Admiral was amazed to receive the worst possible news from the Chikuma’s scout plane — a vague report that an ‘estimated ten ships’ had been sighted in the northeast. Nagumo paced the bridge for another 15 minutes, then asked the reconnaissance plane for more specific information and ordered the second planes to be rearmed with torpedoes. At 0809 hours the scout plane reported that the enemy force consisted of five cruisers and five destroyers; at 0820 hours the pilot added that they were accompanied by ‘what appears to be a carrier’ (the Yorktown). Nagumo’s worst fears had been realized, but he could not send his second wave off; the flight decks had to be kept clear to recover the first Midway strike force.

Following the first attack by the Avengers and B-26s the Japanese carrier force had been subjected to a series of attacks, first by the Army B-17s, then by a flight of 11 old Vought SB₂U Vindicators piloted by Marines, and finally by the submarine Nautilus, which had intercepted early reports of the Japanese position. Without fighter cover, however, all the planes were beaten off without scoring a single hit and the submarine was only able to fire one ineffective torpedo before she had to run for her life under a heavy Japanese depth charge attack. At this point Nagumo had been attacked by 52 American planes and one submarine, and had not been touched; his fleet was intact while over half of the aircraft on Midway had been knocked out. As far as he knew he had only to launch one more strike at Midway and deal with one American carrier, but Spruance had already decided on a strategy and launched his own attack forces.

Spruance had originally intended waiting until 0900 hours when he would be about 100 miles from the enemy, but after discussions with his Chief of Staff, Captain Miles Browning, he decided to launch his planes early in hopes of catching the carriers while the Japanese attack planes were being rearmed and refueled. He sent up almost every operational plane he had — 67 Dauntless dive bombers, 29 torpedo bombers, and 20 Wildcats — holding back only 32 Wildcats for combat air patrol. The pilots were given orders based on the assumption that Nagumo would continue on his course toward Midway until his strike planes were recovered at about 0900 hours.

Fletcher, in the Yorktown, had lost sight of Task Force 16 soon after he had sent it dashing on ahead; the two functioned almost as independent units through the rest of the battle. After he recovered his search planes he held back his own attack force for a time, waiting to see if any additional sighting reports would come in. When none did, he sent up his own planes at 0906 hours — 12 torpedo bombers, 17 dive bombers, and six Wildcats. Above his ship flew the Japanese scout plane, now joined by another float plane, the Tone, beaming a homing signal to be used later to guide a strike force directly to the carrier. From that moment the Yorktown was a marked ship.

Recovery operations had begun aboard the four Japanese carriers at 0837 hours, as they steamed toward Midway in a loose box formation — Hiryu and Kaga to the east, Soryu and Akagi to the west — inside a screen of two battleships, three cruisers, and 11 destroyers. But Nagumo was growing increasingly nervous as reconnaissance reports told him of a large force of carrier planes approaching; before his recovery was complete he turned east-northeast to contact the enemy carriers, while his crews worked hastily (and thus, somewhat carelessly) to rearm and refuel the planes.

Fortunately for the Japanese, this change in course caused 35 dive bombers and ten fighters from the Hornet to miss them completely; all of them eventually ran out of fuel and either made forced landings on Midway or ditched. The torpedo squadron from the Hornet, however, had ignored their orders and set off on their own course; at 0925 hours they spotted smoke from the Japanese ships and swooped down to attack in the face of heavy anti-aircraft fire and a large number of Zeros. Without air cover they had no chance — all 15 planes were shot down and 29 of the 30 pilots were killed. At 0930 the 14 torpedo bombers from the Enterprise arrived, also without fighter cover; ten were shot down and the remaining four were so badly battered they could hardly make their escape. At 1000 hours Torpedo 3 from the Yorktown arrived with six Wildcats, who were quickly driven off by about 15 Zeros in the only fighter plane action to take place over the Japanese fleet. Only five of the 12 torpedo planes and three of the Wildcats survived the attack. No hits had been registered by the 47 aircraft, only six of which returned.

Meanwhile, 37 dive bombers from the Enterprise had been searching vainly for the Japanese force when the leader of the Wildcat fighter squadron radioed that he was over the enemy fleet, but that he was short on fuel and was heading home. This was the first news that Spruance and Browning had had of their strike, and Lieutenant Commander Clarence McClusky, leader of the squadron, could hear Browning screaming, ‘Attack! Attack!’ over the radio. Replying ‘Wilco, as soon as I find the bastards,’ he headed toward the carriers. At 1002 hours the dive bombers raced down from 14,000 feet toward the Akagi and Kaga.

To be concluded in Part Four  . . . . .